Interposition, The Barrier Against Tyranny by Williams, John Bell
University of Mississippi 
eGrove 
Pamphlets and Broadsides Citizens' Council Collection 
1-25-1956 
Interposition, The Barrier Against Tyranny 
John Bell Williams 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/citizens_pamph 
 Part of the United States History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Williams, John Bell, "Interposition, The Barrier Against Tyranny" (1956). Pamphlets and Broadsides. 44. 
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/citizens_pamph/44 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Citizens' Council Collection at eGrove. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pamphlets and Broadsides by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more 





Representative John Bell Williams 
CD-Miss.) 
In the United States 
House of Representatives 
January 25, 1956 
LAWRENCE-GREENWOOO 67395 
I NTERPO:SITION: 
The Barrier Against Tyranny 
Mr. !Speaker, on May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court 
of the United ,States drove a knife into the heart of 
the American Constitution. On that date the Su-
pren1e Court delegated unto itself and the Federal 
Government ,certain powers in excess of those granted 
under the Constitution. On that date, nine appointed 
Justices assumed unto themselves the power to 
amend the Constitution in the absence of approval by 
the people 'Or the several States in the manner which 
is provided in the Constitution. Wilfully and wan-
tonly, they violated every principle of established 
law. They usurped the legislative powers of the Con-
gress, and contributed affirlnatively to the destruc-
tion of our dual sovereignty form of Government. 
For purposes of this discussion, let us set aside 
the emotional ,and political 'aspects .of the subject 
matter involved in those decisions as well as the 
merits or demerits ,of racial segregation per se, and 
consider instead the Constitutional crisis which the 
people of the 48 States face as a result of the Court's 
action. 
For the States of this Union, north or south, to 
permit the Supreme Court's brazen act of usurpation 
to stand unchallenged is for them to surrender meek-
ly their sovereignty to the Central Government. For 
the States to permit their sovereignties to be so 
usurped would be to provide the foundation on which 
oligarchies are built. 
Because some States do not have segregaition laws, 
their ,people may think that the Court's illegal ruling 
is of no importance to them. They may even believe 
conscientiously that the Federal Government would 
be morally justified in the employment of its full 
force and power against the Southern States in order 
to compel integration of the races. 
If they believe either, they a['e overlooking the 
disastrous effects of the Court's action of May 17, 
1954. 
If the Supreme Court has the inherent right, un-
der its judicial powers (which are not clearly defined 
in the Constitution) to amend the Constitution in this 
instance, the Court may likewise amend the Consti-
tution by interpretation in cases affecting other 
States, a'nd in matters equally as vital to theIne 
Chief Justice John Marshall,. a Federalist himself, 
whose opinions would certainly show him a believer 
in a strong Central Government, once wrote this lan-
guage into a decision. 
"No political dreamer has ever been wild 
enough to think of breaking down the 
lines that sepaTate the ,States, or of com-
pounding the American people into one 
common mass." 
In their attempt to destroy the lines that separate 
the States and to compound the American people in-
t'0 one 'common mass, the present COUTt found it nec-
essary to go outside the law. They found it necessary 
to use, as the basis for their ruling, various socio-
logical docwnents, some actually written by foreign-
ers whose information on the subject was gained 
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from abstract sources. The Black Monday decisions 
violate every principle of established law. There is 
no basis for such rulings in statutory law, nor can a 
sUbstantial premise be found throughout the entire 
history of Anglo-Saxon common law. 
Mr. Speaker, let us recall for a moment why the 
Constitution came into bein,g and how the Union was 
formed. ,From a Convention of patriots representing 
thirteen independent Colonies, there emerged a docu-
ment forming a Federal Union,. The time was 1787; 
the place, Philadelphia. After declarin,g theiT inde-
pendence from the British Cro,wn, they recognized 
the necessity for a common union or federation for 
the mutual protection of all. Acting on this premise, 
a convention was called to meet in Philadelphia in 
the late spring of 1787. In attendance were lovers of 
liberty who had made extreme sacrifices and endured 
extraordinary hardships in their common resistance 
to tyranny. The Colonies' independence had been 
secured at a very high price: Death,. destruction, pri-
vation, bankruptcy, and a tragic war. The high price 
paid for thek liberty was fresh in the minds of the 
assembled patriots,. 
In that convention each Colony voluntarily sur ... 
rendered to the Union certain powers which they re-
garded as necessary to the purposes: and functions of 
the Central Government. These powers so surren-
dered were specifically enumerated and carefully lim-
ited. The individual States reserved to themselves. all 
powers not expressly delegated t'O the Union nor pro-
hibited to themselves in accordance with the ternlS 
of their compact. 
In spite of the cauti'Ous wotrding of the original 
document, the States refused to ratify the Constitu-
tion until ample assurance was .given to the States 
and the people that the 'Central Government so cre-
ated could never devour its creators, or deprive the 
people of their "inalienable" rights. As a result, the 
Bill of Rights, the first Ten Amendments were added 
t'O the Consti tu tion. 
These Ten Amendments did not expand the au-
thority of the Central Government. On the contrary, 
they further restricted its authority. Like the Ten 
Commandments, our Bill of Rights are "Thou Shalt 
Nots," directed to the Federal Government. They 
shield the pe'Ople and the States from an oppressive 
and tyrannical Government born of over-concentra-
tion of p'Owers. They were, and are now, the basis 
for individual liberty and State sovereignty. 
The Tenth Amendment clarified the matter of 
delegated and reserved powers - in the simplest of 
language. It reads: 
"The powers. not delegated to the United 
States by the 'Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to. the people." 
In elaborating 'On the Tenth Amendment, the Su-
pre!ne Court said, in 1864: 
"The reservation to the States respectively 
can only mean the reservation of the rights 
of sovereignty which they respectively 
possessed before the adoption of the Con-
stitution of the United States and which 
they had not parted from by that instru-
ment. And any legislation by Congress be-
yond the limits of the power delegated 
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would be trespassing UPQn the rights of 
the States OT the people and would nQt be 
the supreme law of the land, but null and 
vQid.{Gordon v. United S,tates, 117 U.S. 
697)." 
In this particular case ithe CQurt had reference to 
an Act of Congress, but its, application is to the PQwer 
of Federa'l Government. It follows, of CQurse, that 
whichever branch of the Federal Govern,ment goes 
beyond the limits of the power delegated to' it is tres-
passing upon the rights Qf the States or the people 
and such act is null and void. The Tenth Amendment 
applies with equal force to all agencies of the Fed-
eral Government. 
Mr. Speaker, for nearly a century and a half the 
Supreme Court, the Congress and the Executive rec-
ognized that the power to segregate the races was 
among the reserved powers of the States. Like the 
police Po.wer, the power to. maintain and regulate 
schools, the power to segregate the races was re-
served to the States for the reason that it was nQt 
specifically delegated to' CQngress nor prQhibited to' 
the States in the CQnstitution. 
The Supreme 'Court had many opportunities to 
construe the meaning of the FQurteenth Amendment, 
and did so on several occasions. 
The Court consistently held that States must ex-
tend equal protection of their law to' all persons; but 
not specifically the same p~rotection to' all persons. 
The C-ourt's language was' never intended to prevent 
reasonable classification as long as all classes were 
treated alike. This was known as "separate but equal" 
dQctrine. The present Court upset the historical find-
ings of the Federal J udiciaxy in their decisiQn of May 
17, 1954, by saying: "We conclude that in the field Qf 
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' 
has no place. Separate educational facilities are in-
herently unequal." 
In the words Qf the Indianapolis Star, under date 
Qf January 3, 1956: 
"But we believe that in the issuance to t,he 
States, in the name of the Federal Govern-
ment, Qfan oxder to cease the operation of 
segregated schools, the Supreme Court ex-
ceeded the Constitutional authority of the 
Federal Government. 
"The single conclusion: on whic,h the Court 
rested its assumption Qf this authority was, 
after all, a shaky, one. It was, the Court's 
arbitrary assertion, thereafter referred to' 
as a fact, that separate schools: cannot pos-
sibly be equal. Carried to its logical con-
clusion, this means that Indianapolis Pub-
lic 'Schools 80 and 84, to pick two at ran-
dom, cannot be equal because they are 
separate. TO' be sure they are sep,arate on 
the basis of pupils' addxesses rather than 
race or some other ch,aracteristic. But they 
are separate nonetheless, and pupils arbi-
trarily assigned to Qne or the other. Going 
further, it could be said that if there are 
two third-grade classes in- a given school, 
they cannot be equal because they are sep-
arate. In short, if what the Supreme Court 
asserted as a fact is indeed a fact, the only 
community equality of educational oppor-







on this premise the Court assumed appli-
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the States' operation of public school sys-
:tems." 
Mr. Speaker, it is quite obvious that the Court 
not only undertook to rewrite the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which they have no right to do, but :they also 
have rendered ,a decision which is utterly impossible 
of enforcement. 
Let us take a further look at the background of 
the Black Monday decisions. The language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is the same as when it was 
su,bmitted by Congress and ratified by the States. 
The present Supreme Court would have us believe 
that its meaning and intent has changed. This is not 
true; it was never intended by the sponsors OT the 
ratifying ,States that it should take from the Srtates 
their right to segregate the races in their public 
schools and other local institutions. How can the 
Court reconcile its interpretation of the intent of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in face of the fact that the 
very 'Congress which submitted it to the States pro-
ceeded to provide for a segregated school system in 
the District of Columbia, over which it exercises do-
main? How can they reconcile their position with the 
fact that a great number of the ratifying States con-
tinued to maintain segregated school systems? 
If the idea had ever been entertained that segre-
gated schools were to be prohibited by the .operation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it stands to reason 
that Congress and the States would have abandoned 
their segregated school systems then and there. Cer-
tainly they would not have violated their own crea-
ture in the very act of creation. 
The Constitution of the .State· of Mississippi was 
adopted in 1890, and it provides for separate public 
schools for the white ·and negro races. The question 
of whether this provision was in conflict with the 
Fourteenth Amendment was raised in the case of 
Gon·g Lum vs. Rice (275 U.S. 78) before the S,upreme 
Court in 1927. Chief Justice Taft, in deliverin'g the 
Court's opinion, said: 
''The right and p.ower of the State to reg-
ulate the method of providing for the edu-
cation of its youth at public expense is 
clear." 
Previously, in the case of Cumming v. Richmond 
County Board of Educa'tion, 175 U.S. 528, 545, the 
Court had said, in an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice 
Harlan: 
"U·nder the circumstances disclosed, we 
cannot say that the action of the State 
Court was, within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a denial by the 
.Sta te to the Plaintiffs * * * of the equal 
protection of the laws, or of any privileges 
belonging to them as citizens of the Uni.ted 
States. We may add that * * III the edu-
cation of the people in schools maintained 
by State taxation is a matter belonging to 
the respective States, * • *." 
In the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S'. 53'7, 544, 
545, the Court had held the "separate but equal" doc-
trine as being inconformity with the intent of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In that case, the 'C.ourt had 
held that the establishment of separate schools for 
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white and colored children "has been held to be ·a 
valid exercise of the legislative power even of Courts 
of States where the political rights ·of the colored race 
have been longest and most rigidly enforced." 
There is no doubt but that the Supreme Court has 
the authority to construe the ' Constitution when the 
issue is of first impression before the Court and there 
is no legisJative history of the issue. But in the de-
segregation cases: there were a long line of Court 
decisions, as well as ninety yeats of legislative his-
tory. In nearly three score cases, the Federal Judi-
ciary has held to the separate bu1; equal maxim. For 
nearly a century, the Congress and State Legislatures 
made laws in reliance on the settled principle that 
each State had the power to regulate its school sys-
tem without interference by the Federal Government. 
In effect, the Supreme Court has now ,amended the 
Constitution, taking from the States powers exercised 
by them since the formation of the Union. 
Only the people, acting through two-thirds of 
their national representatives' and three-fourths of 
their State Legislatures or ,State Conventions can 
legally amend the Constitution. The Supreme Court 
cannot lawfully do it. But if the Black Monday de-
cisions ~e allowed to stand, it will have' been 
amended. -
If the Court is sustained in its continued usurpa-
tion of power, State boundaries will be erased and 
the Constitution rendered meaningless. 
On May 17 ,1954, the· Court did not suggest or 
contend that the principle enunciated in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, in ,Cumming v. County Board of Education, 
in 'Gonig Lum v. Rice, and all the other cases were 
bad decisions. The Court did not say they were er-
roneous interpretations of the Constitution. Instead, 
the Court held that these . previous' decisions, were 
bad "psychology" and errors in "sociology." 
If we are to recognize the Supreme Court's Black 
Monday decisions as valid and binding, then we must 
als.o ·assume that the Tenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution was repealed by the enactment of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Certainly such was not the :in-
tention of those who forced the Fourteenth Amend-
ment through the Congress and subsequently fought 
for its ratification by the States. 
Is the Supreme Court of the United Sta,tes, consist-
ing of nine men holding office by appointment, and 
answerable not to' the people but to their respective 
conscien'ces, if such they have, to exercise final and 
absolute dominion .over every phase .of s.ociety? Are 
they to be recognized as the sole and only judges of 
the limits to which the Federal Agency may go in 
the exercise of its powers, the Constitution to' the 
contrary notwithstanding? Are we to assume that 
the States and the people are helpless and with.out 
recourse against uncO'ns:titutional usurpatiO'ns of au-
thority by the Federal establishment? Are the States 
defenseless? Must they yield t.o Federal authority, 
when the exercise or assumption of that authority is 
beyond the limitatiO'ns imposed on the Federal estab-
lishment in the Constitution? 
If these premises are to' be recognized as sound, 
then we have already changed our form of GO'vern-
ment, and no longer live under a Constitutional Re-
public. If these premises are sound,. we are wasting 
th.e fruits of the peO'ples' labors in maintaining State 
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Governments and in supporting 'County and Munici-
pal Governments. 
The Federal Government, being a creature of the 
several States, through usurpation, is slowly but sure-
ly cannibalizing its creators, to the end that it and it 
alone shall sit in exclusive judgment of the acts of the 
citizens of the several States. 
If an unlimited Central Government is to be ac-
cording to the will of our people, then it should be 
established by the people. The Court, an appointed 
body, is clothed neither with the authority nor the 
ability to speak for the people. 
Look for a moment to the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, which holds that Government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. In elab-
orating further on this doctrine, the Declaration of 
Independence warns us as follows: 
"Prudence, indeed, will dictate that gov-
ernments long established s:hould not be 
changed for light and transcient causes; 
and accordingly all experience hath shown 
that mankind are more disposed to suffer 
while evils are sufferable, than to right 
themselves by abolishing the forms to 
which they are accustomed. But when a 
long train of abuses, and usurpations * • • 
evinces a design to reduce them underr ab-
solute despotism, it is their right, it is their 
duty, to throw off such government, and to 
provide new guards for their future se-
curity." 
These wo~ds were directed to the King of England 
and the tyranny of his regime, of course. Not the 
least among their grievances was the assertion: 
"He (the Kin'g) has combined with others 
to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to 
our constitutions and un'acknowledged by 
our laws, giving his assent to their pre-
tended acts of legislation • • • for tak-
ing away our charters, abolishing our most 
valuable laws, and altering fundamentally 
the forms of cur governments; for sus-
pending our legislatures, and declaring 
themselves invested with power to legis-
late for us in all cases whatsoever. • • • 
In every state of these oppressions we 
have petitioned for redress in the most 
humble terlns: Our repeated petitions 
have been answered only by ;repeated in-
j.uries." 
Today, the people of the S:outhern States suffer 
oppression at the hands' of an irresponsible Supreme 
Court. We have seen that Court arbitrarily void 
provisions of our Charters; they have abolished some 
of our most valuable laws, and they have virtually 
declared themselves invested with power to legislate 
for us in all cases. 
Yes, Mr. Speaker, we in the States have petitioned 
again and again to this Court for redress, but the 
Court turns a deaf ear to our pleas, choosing instead 
to harken to the cons,cienceless demands of minority 
pressure groups seeking political favor, and to whom 
the preservation of Constitutional Government is a 
matter of neither moment nor consequence. 
Annually we gather in ,this Chamber for a reading 
of Washington's F,arewell Address to Congress. We 
[ 7 ] 
• 
accord the readmg of this document the proper out-
ward reverence and honor which it certainly de-
serves, and we can do no less. Many hear its reading, 
but few listen to the words or attempt to grasp its 
profound meanings. 
If one listens closely to the next re.ading of this 
monumental message, he will he,ar this admonition to 
all who shall live under the Constitution of the 
United States: 
"The Constitution which at any time ex-
ists till changed by an explicit -and authen-
tic act of the whole people is sacredly ob-
ligatory upon all. * * * But let there be 
no change by usurpation; fOir though this 
in one instance may be the instrument of 
good, it is the customary weapon by which 
free governments are destroyed." 
As God-fearing people, we are obligated to resist 
tyranny, no matter what fornl it may take. If we are 
true to ourselves, we must resist it even when it 
wears the sheep's clothin'g. of judicial robes, if free-
dom- is to be the lega'cy we leave to our children. 
The resolving of this crisis does not call for com-
placency, timidity, or cowardice. It will call for 
taxing new reservoirs of courage, and will dem-and 
sacrifices that will test the strength of our convic-
tions. In the face of the Supreme Court's brazen 
usurpation of authority, its flagrant disregard of Con-
stitutional limitations, its wilful flauntin'g of judicial 
precedents, its wanton ·contempt for the doctrine of 
stare decisis and recognized principles of established 
law, we must resort to drastic measures if we are to 
preserve the structure of our Republic. This will 
mean suffering and sacrifice on the peart of liberty-
loving Americans, and it means seizing the offensive 
from the conscienceless self-seeking elements who 
seek to destroy our Republic. It means that we must 
seek and find the courage that distin'guished our 
. gJ."eat American ancestors in their struggle to build 
this Republic, and there can be no retreating from 
principle for an~ cause whatsoever. 
Mr. iSpeaker, inasmuch as the Federal Government 
is a creatUire of the States, it is ·the solemn duty of 
the ,States to protect themselves from encroachments 
upon their sovereignty. No machinery for this is set 
up in the Constitution. No relief is available in the 
statutes. Yet the law teaches u.s that for every wrong 
there must be a remedy. 
The Black Monday decisions of the Federal Judi- · 
ciary go beyond the limits of delegated powers and 
therefore are an invasion of powers reserved to the 
States, but ,the States have a remedy. It was first used 
by Geor.gia in the 1790's. It was used by Kentucky 
and Virginia in the same decade. Other States used 
it in the Nineteenth Century. Jefferson, Madison and 
Calhoun were its authors and originators. It was 
called the Doctrine of Interposition. 
In the words of Jefferson from the Kentucky Res-
olutions: 
"Resolved, that the several States com-
posing the United States of America are 
not united on the principle of unlimited 
submission to their general Government; 
but that by compact under the style and 
title of a Constitution for the United States 
and of amendments thereto, they consti-
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tuted a general Government for special 
purposes, delegated to that Government 
certain definite powers, . reserving each 
State to itself, the residuary mass' of right 
to their own self-government; and that 
whensoever the General Government as-
sumes undelegated powers, its acts are un-
authoritative, void and of no force: 
"That to thiscoIDpact each State acceded 
as a State, and is an integral party, its co-
IStates forming as to itself, the other party: 
'''That the Government created by this 
pact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers dele-
gated to itself, since that would have made 
its discretion and not the Constitution the 
measure of its powers; but that as in all 
other cases of compact am~)ll!g parties hav-
in;g no common judge, each party has an 
eq ual ri,gh t to judge for itself, as well of 
infractions as of the mode and measure 
of redress * • • ." 
In the words of M,adison (Committee Report on 
the Virginia Resolutions): 
"It appears Ito your committee to be a 
plain principle, founded in common sense, 
illustrated by common practice, an,d essen-
tial to the nature of compacts, that where 
resort can be had to no tribuJ?,al superior to 
the au thori ty of the parties, the parties 
themselves must be made the rightful 
judges, in the last resort, whether the bar-
gain has been pursued or violated. 
"The Constitution of the United States 
was formed by the sanction of the States, 
given by each in its sovereign capacity. 
It adds to the stability and dignity, as well 
as to the authority of the Constitution, that 
it rests 'On this legitimate and solid foun-
dation. 
• 
"The S ta tes, then, being the parties to the 
Constitutional compact, and in their sover-
eign capacity, it follows of necessity that 
there can be no tribunal above their au-
thority to decide, in the last resort, wheth-
er the compact made by them be violated; 
and, consequently, that, as the parties to 
it, they must decide themselves, in the 
last resort, such questions as may be of 
sufficient magnitude to require their inter-
"t" " POS! Ion .... 
In the words of Calhoun: 
"This right of interposition, thus solemnly 
asserted by the State of Virginia, be it 
called what it may~State-right, veto, nul-
lification, or by any other name I con-
oeive to be the fundamental principle of 
our system, resting on facts historically as 
certain as our revolution itself, and deduc- . 
tions as simple and demonstrative as that 
of any political or moral truth whatever; 
and I firmly believe that on its recognition 
depends the staJbility and safety of our po-
Ii tical institutions. . . . " 
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None can say that these three great statesmen 
were advocating anything but preservation of the 
Constitution and the Union. They had contributed as 
much, if not more, than all their contemporaries to 
the creation of this Republic. Certa.inly their philos-
ophy and their interpretation of Constitutional limi-
tations should be given credence today, when the 
relationship of the Federal Union to the States is in 
• lssue. 
The right of the States to check encroachments of 
the Federal Government must, of necessity, be an 
integral part of our system of dual sovereignty, and 
vice versa.. What happens when a State encroaches 
on the Federal Government's delegated powers? The 
Federal Government immediately interposes its sov-
ereignty between the encroachment and the citizens 
affected. Does anyone believe that our Founding 
Fathers would confer such power on the creature and 
withhold it from the creator? No, Mr. Speaker, the 
principle of interposition is a fundamental part of ou[" 
system of dual sovereignty. The right of interposition 
should be reserved for use only when there is-a delib-
erate, palpable and dangerous usurpation of the sov-
ereign States' powers. 
A precedent in American history, when interposi-
tion was carried to its logical conclusion, occurred in 
Georgia. 
Georgia and the Supreme Court, 1792-3 
The issue in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia was 
the right of the S,upreme Court to hear cases in which 
a State was sued by 'a citizen of another State. Chis-
holm, a citizen of South C,arolina, sued Georgia to 
recover some lands confis'cated during the Revolu-
tionary War. 
Georgia refused to recognize the competence of 
the Supreme Court to hea([' the case, and when the 
case came to the Court in 1792, Georgia declined to 
enter an appearance, but merely submitted a written 
remonstrance against the jurisdiction of the Court. 
In 1793, the Supreme Court ordered Georgia to ap-
pear under penalty of a judgment by default for Chis-
holm. Georgia maintained its defiance and a writ of 
inquiry was awarded for Chisholm. 
The writ was never executed and Georgia suc-
ceeded in its defiance of the Court. Opposition to the 
Cour.t's assumption of jurisdiction was intense in 
Georgia (the ,State House of Representatives passed a 
bill declaring it a felony punishable by death for 
anyone to attempt to exe,cute any compulsory process 
issuing from the Supreme Court in this case) and 
widespread in the other States. On the day after the 
Court's decision was announced, a Constitutional 
Amendment was introduced in Congress to prevent a 
State from being sued in the Federal courts. The 
Eleventh Amendment, which reverses the decision in 
Chisholm v. Georgia, was finally ratified in 1798. 
Thelre were .other cases where the right of inter-
position was imposed, but they turned .into open de-
fiance and were never followed through to their logi-
cal conclusion. Several interposition resolutions lay 
inactive or were withdrawn without following the 
amendment process. Othelrs were not followed through 
because the legislation protested was amended, or 
repealed by Congress. Notable examples of the latter 
are the interposition resolutions of many northern 
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States in the matter of the Fugitive Slave Law, and 
South Carolina on the Tariff issue. Cases are cited 
below-not as examples of complete interposition, 
but as examples of the forms of interposition that 
have occurred in American history. 
Pennsylvania and the Federal Couris-
The Case of the Sloop Active 
This conflict between the Pennsylvania and Fed-
eral Government originated in the Revolutionary 
War. The sloop Active was captured during the War 
and sold. The Pennsylvania Court of Admiralty ruled 
that the proceeds belonged to the captors, but the 
owners of .the ship appealed to the Conltinerutal Con-
gress, which, through its Committee on Appeals, re-
versed the State court. The ruling of the Committee 
on Appeals was ignored. 
Almost twenty years later, Olmsted, the owner, 
applied to ithe Federal District Court for a process to 
enforce the ;ruling of the Committee on Appeals. In 
1803 ,Federal District Judge Peters ruled that the 
money be paid to Olmsted, but he was defied by the 
State and his: decree was not enforced. Olmsted ap-
plied to the Supreme Court, which in 1809 issued a 
writ of mandamus directing the enfoT'cement of the 
District Court's decree. 
When the S·upreme Court's decision was an-
nounced, the Governor notified the Legis'lature that 
be proposed to call out the· State militia to pre-
vent the enforcement of the Court's decree. The Fed-
eral marshal attempted to serve ~ocess on the State 
Treasurer, but was stopped by the State troops. How-
ever, the marshal declared his intention to callout a 
posse in order to enforce his authority. 
At the last moment the State backed down. The 
process was served and the Legislature appropriated 
the money to pay Olmsted's claim. As a final humili-
ation, the General of the State militia was convicted 
in Federal Court for forcibly resisting the Federal 
marshal. He was, however, pardoned by President 
Madison almost immediately afterwards. 
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Couri-Martin v. Hunter's Lessee 
This conflict between Federal and State authori-
ties arose out of litigation to deterlnine the title to 
certain lands in Virginia. The history of the litigation 
and the issues of law involved are very complex, but 
do not need to be described in an account of· the con-
flict between the two courts. 
In 1810, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that 
Martin's claim to the lands in issue was not valid 
because of Virginia statutes restricting the Tights of 
aliens to inherit land within the Commonwealth. A 
writ of error to the Supreme Court was, however, 
allowed and that Court reversed the Virginia deci-
sion and entered an order requiring the Virginia 
Court of Appeals to enter judgment for Martin. 
The Virginia cowrt refused to comply with the 
mandamus from the Supreme Court. Their refusal 
was based on the independency of the State jUdiciary. 
The Virginia court acknowledged the supremacy 
clause of the Constitution, but denied that this in-
volved the supremacy of the Federal courts. 
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After the Virginia court's refusal to implement 
the Supreme Court's decision, the case weni back to 
the Supreme Court on the sole issue of that Court's 
power to secure compliance with its decisions. Com-
pliance was secured by sending the case back to the 
lower Virginia court in which it had originated and 
which enforced the Supreme Court's decision. 
Connecticut and the Embargo Act, 1809 
The Embargo Act was passed by Congress in 18Q7 
and led to much discontent in the New England 
States. Many memorials against the act were passed, 
but Con1gress ignored the protests and in 1809 passed 
a stringent enforcement act. 
Connecticut refused to cooperate in the enforce-
ment of this act ,and the General Assembly in special 
session resolved "That to preserve the Union, and 
support the Constitution of the United States, it be-
comes the duty of the Legislatures of the States, in 
such a crisis of affairs, vigilantly to watch over, and 
vigorously to maintain, the powers not delegated to 
the United ,States, but reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people; and that a due regard to this 
duty, will not permit this Assembly to assist, or con-
CUT in giving effect to this unconstitutional act, pass-
ed, to enforce the embargo. 
The extent of the opposition to the embargo caused 
Congress to repeal it within a year of this protest. 
Ohio and :the Nationcvl Bank 
In 1819 Ohio placed a tax of $50,000 on every 
branch of the Bank of the United States within its 
borders in order to drive it from the State. Despite 
the Supreme Court decision in McCullough. v. Mary-
land, which had declared such a tax unconstitutional, 
Osborn, the State Auditor, determined to collect the 
tax. He was enjoined from collecting the tax by the 
Circuit Court, but nevertheless proceeded to take it 
by force from one of the branches of the bank. The 
Ohio Legislature supported Osborn in a series of reso-
lutions objecting to the doctrine that the States are 
bound on questions of constitutionality by S·upreme 
Court decisions. The Legislature also passed an "Act 
to withdraw from the Bank of the United States the 
protection of the laws <>f this Starte" as a further way 
of seeking to expel the bank which had been sup-
ported by the Supreme Court. 
The bank instituted pToceedinlgs against Osborn 
and in 1824 the S,upreme Court affirmed a lower court 
decision aga~nst him. The tax money was refunded to 
the bank. 
Georgia and :the Indians 
In the 182.o's Georgia' became dissatisfied with the 
slowness of the Federal Government's removal of the 
Creek Indians from Georgia territory. Governor 
Troup charged the Federal Goverrunent was failing 
to carry out its promises and ordered a Starte survey 
of the lands. President Adams threatened to use the 
army to stop the 'Georgia surveyors, but Governor 
Troup successfully defied him. The issue was settled 
by the withdrawal of :the Creeks beyond the Missis-
• • SIppI. 
At the same time as the Creek controversy, Geor-
gia also took over the lands of the Cherokees within 
its borders. The Cherokee laws were annulled and 
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Georgia statutes enforced in the territory. This con-
troversy went to the Supreme Court when a C·herokee 
was convicted under Georgia la,v and sentenced to 
death. The Supreme Court granted a writ of error, 
but it was ignored and the Cherokee was executed. 
At least two other cases arising out of the Georgia 
statutes regulating the Cherokee lands were appealed 
to the ,Supreme Court. In both, the Court ruled against 
the State, but in each case the State authorities ig-
nored all communications from the Court and the 
criminal penalties awarded by the Georgia courts 
were carried out. 
Nullification in South Carolina 
Opposition to the protective tariff increased in 
South Carolina throughout the 1820's. The 1828 "Tar-
iff of Abominations" produced a formal protest from 
the State Legislature and nullification sentiment in-
creased for the next four years. The tariff of 1832 
did not alleviate the situation and in the fall of 1832 
the ,State Legislature issued a call for a State conven-
tion. The convention met in November, 1832, and 
passed an Ordin'ance of Nullification that declared the 
protective tariff unconstitutional and authorized the 
Legislature to take all steps necessary to prevent the 
enforcement of the ta,riff acts as from February, 1833. 
President Jackson responded with a message de-
claring that he would enfotr'ce the tariff with all the 
means at his dispos'al and a "Force Bill" was intro-
duced in Congress. 
T.he Force Bill was passed, together with a com ... 
promise tariff act that was acceptable to South Caro-
lina. The South Carolina con~ention reassembled in 
March, rescinded its · nullification act against the tar-
iff, but passed an Ordinance of Nullification against 
the Force Act. 
Fugitive Slaves and Personal Laws 
The Federal Fugitive S,lave Act of 1793 caused 
opposition from States in which abolitionist senti-
ment was strong. The Act relied on State officers to 
enforce its provisions and several States passed laws 
extending the right of jury trial to suspected fugi-
tive slaves. Such laws were passed in Indiana 
(1824), Connecticut (1838), Vermont (1840), and ' New 
York (1840). Though these laws were not direct chal-
lenges to Federal authority, they undoubtedly were 
designed to hinder the operation of the Federal 
statute. 
The situation was altered by the decision of the 
Supreme Court in the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania. 
The significant portion of the decision was the ruling 
that State officers could not be compelled to. enforce 
a Federal s,tatute. As a direct result four States (Mas-
sachusetts, Vermont, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island) 
passed laws prohibiting State officers from perforln-
ing the duties assigned to them under the law of 1793 
and alsO' forbidding the use of 'State jails for fugitive 
slaves. 
A new Federal Fugitive Slave Act was passed in 
1850 which did not rely on State officers for its en-
forcement. Personal liberty laws providing s'afe-
guards for the fugitive slave and makinlg the enforce-
ment of the law more difficult were passed in ten 
States (Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Maine, Wisconsin, Kansas, Ohio, 
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and Pennsy 1 vania) . 
The most positive defiance of the Federal Govern-
ment on the fugitive slave issue occurred in Wisicon-
sin in the 185.o's. Sherman Booth, an abolitionist edi-
tor, was arrested for forcibly rescuing a fugitive 
slave. The State Supreme Court released him on a 
writ of habeas corpus and at the same time held the 
Federal Fugitive Slave Law unconstitutional. How-
ever, Booth was indicted and convicted in the United 
States District Court only to have the State Supreme 
Court again release him. In 1855 the Supreme Court 
issued a writ 'Of error, but the Wisconsin court ig-
nored it and refused to send a copy of its record. 
The Supreme Court managed to procure a copy 
of the record in 1857 and in 1858 reversed the judg-
ment of the Wisconsin COUTt. The State courts refused 
to enforce the verdict, but Booth was arrested by a 
United ,States marshal in 1860. He was rescued, re-
arrested, and finally pardoned by President Buchanan 
in the same year. 
'TIhe South Carolina Nullification Resolution of 
183'2 nullified a revenue act designed to finance the 
United States Government. The revenue act was 
clearly within the delegated powers of the Congress, 
and was an act which it was constitutionally empow-
ered to pass. There was no. question in this case but 
that the act was constitutional. 
Following the adoption by South Carolina of its 
nullification resolution, the Legislatures of the States 
of Mississippi, Alabama, North Carolina an,d Virginia 
adopted resolutions taking exceptions to South Caro-
lina's right thus to nullify a legal and constitution~l 
act of Congress. Even so, South Carolina won a dis-
tinct victory by her act of nullification. 
I do not contend, in spite 'Of this precedent, that a 
State can nullify an act which C'onigress has the con ... 
stitutional right to pass. No State can legally void 
actions of the Federal Government when those ac-
tions are clearly within the scope of powers delegated 
to the Federal Government by the Constitution. If 
such acts could be so nullified, we would have no ef-
fective Federal Government, of course. 
But, Mr. Speaker, this is not the case presented by 
the May 17, 1954, decision. In the present case, the 
Supreme Court is clearly attempting to destroy the 
Constitution itself. It has made an abortive attempt 
to amend the Constitution. It is attempting to nullify 
the powers reserved to the States under the Constitu-
tion. Through acts of interposition, the States \vould 
merely be seeking to nullify the action of the nul-
lifiers. . 
By design, the Supreme Court has committed a 
deliberate, palpable, and dangerous invasion of the 
field of sovereignty ex·clusively reserved to the 
States. The nine Justices have committed an act of 
treason against the Constitution of the Uni!ted States. 
It is the duty of the States, in the face of such fla-
grant and illegal assumption of power by the Federal 
judiciary, to interpose their sovereignty and nullify 
the decision. In doing so, the States are protecting 
the Constitution against nullification by the Courts, 
and are protecting the liberties of the American 
people . 
. The time is at hand when the States must reassert 
their constitutional rights or suffer their own de-
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struction. The zero hour f'Or Sitate Governments has 
arrived, and it might well be the zero hour, also, for 
our Republican form of Government. 
Mr. Speaker, I have heard many say that they 
favor interposition, but are opposed to nullification. 
This is the same thing as saying that we favor the 
aiming and firing of our guns but we are against hit-
ting the target. 
The very purpose of interposition is to nullify. If 
that is not to be rthe purpose, the act of interposition 
becomes merely an expression of disfavor and is 
meaningless. 
Mr. ·Speaker, interposition is the act by which a 
State attempts to nullify. Interposition without nulli-
fication is a knife without an edge, a gun with'Out 
bullets, a car with'Out an engine, a body without a 
life. 
If the fStates are to preserve their sovereignties, if 
they are to preserve the Constitution, they must in-
terpose and declare the Black Monday decisions to be 
illegal and invalid and 'Of no force and effect within 
the territorial limits of their respective jurisdictions. 
This position I believe the ·States have the right and 
duty to take and to maintain until such time as this 
question of contested powers has been settled legally 
and finally by constitutional amendment . .. 
Mr. Speaker, the South desires nothing more or 
less than its right to order and control its own affairs 
within the limitations of its constitutional preroga-
tives. · The Southern .States will not submit to judicial 
tyranny any more than our sister States will s-anction 
illegal usurpations of their sovereignty. In seeking 
relief from the oppression of this decision, we must 
and will calIon our sister ·States for their support to 
the end that the sovereign rights afall the States shall 
be preserved. 
Mr. Speaker, while the Black Monday decisions 
constitute the basis for our present grievance, it might 
be well for the ,States of this Union to take stock of 
other usurpations of their sovereign powers. Treaty-
making powers, taxing p'Owers, the interstate com-
merce clause and Government con1petition with pri-
vate enterprise have all been, in recent years, the 
subject of frequent abuse by the three branches of 
the Federal Government. If we are to n1.aintain our 
present form of Government, . the tilne is at hand 
when the States should take action, also, to re-define 
delegated and reserved powers. 
Again I emphasize that public school segregaition, 
as vital as it is to the people of my State and the 
South, is but part of the all-embracing problem 
brought on by the Black Monday decisions. There 
have been deliberate, palpable, and dangerous en-
croachments in other fields. The trend toward cen-
tralization of power into the hands of the few was 
merely stabilized and amplified by the Black Mon-
day decisions. It is quite apparent that we can expect 
more and more such abortive invasions of State sov-
ereignties, and more and more usurpation 'Of power 
by the Federal establishment. The question of \vheth-
er the States are sovereign in the matter of reserved 
powers should be settled now, once and for all. 
What will be the object of the Supreme Court's 
next act 'Of usurpation? What among Jefferson's "in-
alienable rights" will be next to suffer destruction by 
judicial legislation? 
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Will it be the police power of the States? Intra-
state transportation and commerce? Will it be State 
and local regulatory powers. Will it be property 
rights, marriage laws, contract laws, criminal laws? 
If we surrender to this trend, where will it end: Can 
anyone say? 
In discussing the unsurrendered powers of the 
States, the Court, in 1911, said: 
"Among the powers of the State not sur-
rendered-which power therefore remains 
with the State-is the power to regulate 
the relative rights and duties of all within 
its jurisdiction as to guard the public mor-
als, the public safety, and the public 
health,as well as to promote the public 
convenience and the common good." (Chi-
cago, et al v. McGuire, 219 I.S. 549.) 
Will this be the next principle of Constitutional 
Government to feel the axe of the Court's usurpation? 
We know not which principle of Constitutional 
Government will be next to be attacked. Therefore,. 
the people are entitled to know whether the Statess--
the original source of all Federal authority~r the 
Federal Government itself is to be the final and su-
preme arbiter of the extent of delegated and reserved 
powers under our Constitution. 
Jefferson once said: "Timid men * * 11& ( prefer ..... __ 
the calm of despotism to the boisterous sea of liberty." 
He said "The God that gave us life gave us liberty -.. 
at the same time: The hand of force ,may destroy, but 
cannot disjoin them." It was his creed that resistance 
to tyranny. was obedience to God .. 
Mr. Speaker, the s;ame God that watched over 
Jefferson, and inspired him to swear etern'al hostility 
to tyranny watches over us. With His Divine guid-
ance and help, we shall not fail. 
Additional copies may be had, postpaid, for: 
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WHEN YOU FINISH READING THIS 
PAS-S IT ON TO SOMEONE ELSE. 
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